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Don’t trust your poll lead:  
how public opinion changes during 
referendum campaigns
alan renwick
our politicians are increasingly enthusiastic about promising referendums. Indeed, on a range of constitutional matters, the 
convention is now that politicians have little choice but to call a 
referendum if they want to pursue change. Naturally enough, so 
far as they can, they want to hold only referendums that they are 
going to win.
But such votes sometimes deliver sharp surprises. Lib Dems 
pressed in 2010 for a referendum to change the electoral system 
because they believed public desire for political reform would 
carry the day, only to suffer humiliating defeat. In 2013, the Irish 
government held a referendum to abolish the Senate – a move that 
the polls had for years supported – only to see the pro-reform lead 
evaporate in the final months before the vote. The 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum, which many presumed would deliver an 
easy victory for the status quo, ended up going down to the wire.
So politicians and others need to get better at calculating their 
sex ,  l ies  anD the  Ballot  Box
80
chances of winning, and at working out what they can do in a cam-
paign to maximise these chances. To make such predictions, we 
need to know how and why public opinion changes in the course 
of a referendum campaign.
Research conducted by the Canadian political scientist, Larry 
LeDuc, combined with my own updates, reveals the general 
pattern.
The following figure shows the difference between the percent-
age of voters who say they will vote ‘Yes’ in pre-referendum polls 
(up to one month before polling day, ignoring the ‘don’t knows’) 
and the percentage who actually vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum.
If the bar points down, that means support for ‘Yes’ goes down. 
If the bar points up, support for ‘Yes’ goes up.
DifferenCe Between suPPort for ‘yes’ in Pre-referenDum 
oPinion Polls anD suPPort in the referenDum (%)
Source: Figures compiled by Lawrence LeDuc and the author
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It is not difficult to see that support for the ‘Yes’ option – which 
almost always means the change option – goes down more often 
than it goes up. Of the thirty-four referendums shown, support 
for reform goes down in twenty-three and up in only eleven. Fur-
thermore, the drops in support are typically much bigger than the 
rises: the total area of all the bars below the line is thirteen times 
greater than the area of the bars above.
That suggests that, unless you are already way ahead in the polls, 
you should be cautious of advocating a referendum on your pet 
reform idea.
But we can be more subtle in our analysis than that. Support for 
change generally falls as polling day approaches, but there are some 
exceptions. If we really want to know our chances of success, we 
will want to understand the exceptions as well as the rule.
Why does support for change generally fall? The main reason is 
that uncertain voters typically end up sticking with the devil they 
know. If you are unsure quite what effects a change will have, then 
it is safer to hold to the familiarity of the status quo. This mecha-
nism is accentuated if the idea of reform sounds appealing at first 
blush; voters may respond positively to pollsters when they have 
not really thought the matter through, only for doubts to develop 
as they engage later. Examples of this abound. The most familiar 
in the UK is the electoral reform referendum of 2011. The idea of 
shaking up the political system, particularly after the expenses scan-
dal, initially appealed to many voters; but as they engaged more, 
they worried about AV’s possible implications, and most ended up 
voting ‘No’. More strikingly still, Ireland’s voters opted in Octo-
ber 2013 to retain their Senate even though polls had long shown 
a majority for abolition. Fear of empowering the government too 
far changed many minds.
What, then, explains the exceptions to these patterns? There are 
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three basic reasons why support for reform may pick up steam. The 
first and most banal is that voters sometimes already know what 
they think well ahead of the vote. If opinion is already settled, scope 
for a drop in the ‘Yes’ vote is limited. The Scottish devolution ref-
erendum of 1997 provides a good example. It was, famously, the 
‘settled will’ of the Scottish people that they should obtain a degree 
of self-government, and the polls barely changed throughout the 
referendum campaign.
Things get more interesting with the second reason. This is what 
is called ‘reversion point reversal’. The ‘reversion point’ of a refer-
endum is the situation that ensues following a ‘No’ vote. Generally, 
the reversion point is the status quo: if voters opt against change, 
then the pre-existing situation continues. But sometimes the pre-
existing situation can successfully be painted as unsustainable. In 
several European countries, for example, voters, in being asked to 
vote a second time on an EU treaty that they had previously rejected, 
were warned that a second ‘No’ vote could jeopardise their coun-
try’s position in the Union. Fear of the unknown now pushed voters 
towards a ‘Yes’ vote. Similarly, in four EU accession referendums 
in 1994, ‘Yes’ campaigners argued that, in a globalising post-Cold 
War world, isolation was an increasing danger and the old way of 
doing things was no longer an option.
The third and final mechanism is the anti-establishment band-
wagon. If the establishment as a whole opposes reform and voters 
are in the mood to give it a kicking, a bandwagon for change can 
sometimes gather speed. This is particularly likely where the vote 
appears non-decisive and a protest vote therefore carries little dan-
ger. Such conditions applied in New Zealand in 1992 – the highest 
peak in our figure. The referendum was on electoral reform and 
most politicians united against it. Voters wished to express their 
anger over the behaviour of a political class that they thought was 
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out of control. And the referendum was not decisive: a ‘Yes’ vote 
would simply trigger another referendum and a second chance to 
decide the following year.
If, therefore, you want to change the system and you are thinking 
about calling for a referendum to achieve it, beyond just looking at 
the current polling figures, you need to ask yourself three questions:
First, how firm is your support? Do poll respondents back you 
because they have thought about the issue and come to a clear 
view or just because the idea sounds nice? If the latter, expect your 
mouth-watering poll lead to evaporate.
Second, can you plausibly argue that the reform you want, while 
changing certain things for the better, will also protect aspects of 
the status quo that voters cherish? If you can, that could signifi-
cantly boost your prospects.
Finally, are there any plausible bandwagon effects? Bandwagons 
are fickle: they can go one way or the other. So think about whether 
you can use them, but don’t rely on them alone.
In the case of Scotland’s independence referendum, the polls nar-
rowed in the weeks and months before polling day. That happened 
because of deft use by the ‘Yes’ campaign of both reversion point 
reversal and bandwagon effects. Scottish First Minister Alex Sal-
mond argued that independence would protect the National Health 
Service and other aspects of Scotland’s social model from cutters 
and privatisers in Westminster. The pro-independence campaign 
successfully portrayed those who highlighted the uncertainties and 
risks of independence as members or dupes of a distant, arrogant 
elite who wanted to do Scotland down. In addition, in a referen-
dum that sparked exceptional interest and passion, a positive ‘we 
can really do this’ bandwagon also emerged. Ultimately, however, 
it appears that those who made up their minds at the last moment 
plumped, on the whole, for the security of the status quo, and the 
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‘No’ side therefore won. The mechanisms that we see across most 
referendums therefore operated also in this dramatic case.
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